Is National Conference Still Stuck in 1931? Kashmir’s Old Political Language Meets a New Generation
By: Javid Amin | 11 September 2026
From the 1931 uprising and Naya Kashmir to Article 370 and today’s unemployment crisis, the National Conference carries one of Kashmir’s deepest political legacies. But can historical symbolism still answer the everyday questions confronting a younger generation?
Srinagar: In Kashmir’s political vocabulary, few dates carry as much emotional weight as 13 July 1931.
For the National Conference, it is not simply a date in a history book. It represents the beginning of a political struggle against autocratic rule, inequality and political exclusion in the erstwhile princely state of Jammu and Kashmir.
Nine decades later, the language has changed.
The Dogra monarchy is gone. The constitutional arrangement under Article 370 has been altered. Jammu and Kashmir is now a Union Territory, and an elected government operates within a radically different political framework.
Yet the National Conference continues to return to the symbols of that earlier era.
In July 2026, party president Farooq Abdullah and Chief Minister Omar Abdullah again paid tribute to the martyrs of July 13, describing the 1931 events as a defining chapter in the region’s struggle for justice, dignity and democratic rights. The party also described itself as the custodian of that political legacy.
That continuing invocation has fuelled a familiar criticism from political opponents:
Is the National Conference still fighting the political battles of yesterday while Kashmir’s younger generation is asking very different questions today?
The criticism is catchy.
But the reality is more complicated.
The National Conference has unquestionably retained a strong historical and constitutional vocabulary. Yet its manifestos have also contained extensive promises on employment, infrastructure, welfare, entrepreneurship and governance.
The real issue, therefore, is not whether the NC remembers 1931.
It is whether a party built on a historic mass movement can translate that legacy into a convincing political programme for Kashmir in 2026.
First, one historical correction: the NC was not founded in 1931
The phrase “NC is stuck in 1931” sounds powerful, but historically it needs some qualification.
The 1931 agitation was not an NC movement in the institutional sense, because the National Conference did not yet exist.
The July 1931 uprising became an important catalyst for the emergence of organised Kashmiri politics. In October 1932, Sheikh Abdullah and other leaders established the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference.
According to the National Conference’s own historical account, the organisation was renamed the All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference on June 11, 1939, as its leadership sought to broaden the movement beyond a specifically Muslim political identity.
The chronology matters:
1931 — mass agitation against Dogra rule
1932 — Muslim Conference established
1939 — Muslim Conference becomes National Conference
1944 — Naya Kashmir programme
1946 — Quit Kashmir movement
So when today’s NC invokes 1931, it is invoking the political ancestry of the movement, rather than claiming that the present-day party literally existed in 1931.
That distinction makes the current debate more meaningful, not less.
Why 1931 still matters to the National Conference
The July 1931 events occupy a foundational position in the party’s political narrative.
The movement emerged from widespread grievances over political representation, economic inequality and the nature of governance under Maharaja Hari Singh.
The killing of protesters outside Srinagar’s Central Jail on July 13, 1931, became a defining moment in Kashmir’s political history.
For the National Conference, the significance of the day lies in its symbolism: ordinary Kashmiris challenging an authoritarian political structure and demanding a greater voice in governance.
That is why the party continues to commemorate the date.
In July 2026, NC leaders again presented the 1931 martyrs as part of the party’s continuing political inheritance. The party said their sacrifice represented a struggle for justice, dignity and democratic rights.
For supporters, this is not nostalgia.
It is continuity.
Their argument is that the political questions that emerged in the 1930s—representation, dignity, constitutional rights and the relationship between Kashmir’s people and political authority—did not simply disappear with the end of Dogra rule.
Critics see the same symbolism differently.
To them, repeated references to 1931 risk turning historical memory into a substitute for contemporary politics.
The forgotten part of NC’s history: Naya Kashmir
There is an irony in the “stuck in 1931” criticism.
If the National Conference were truly interested only in historical symbolism, it would be overlooking one of the most ambitious modern political documents produced by its own movement.
That document was the Naya Kashmir manifesto of 1944.
Naya Kashmir was not merely an independence-era political slogan.
It proposed a comprehensive programme for constitutional government and socio-economic transformation.
It included ideas relating to:
- universal political participation;
- economic planning;
- agrarian reform;
- workers’ rights;
- women’s rights;
- education;
- social welfare;
- public health; and
- the abolition of landlordism.
The document’s vision was strongly influenced by socialist thinking of the period. Academic research has noted its extensive provisions concerning women’s political and economic equality, including equal rights in employment and public life.
Its economic programme also placed particular emphasis on agriculture, workers and the rural poor.
That history complicates the argument that the NC has always been an identity-first political organisation.
At one point in its history, the party’s political language was remarkably focused on economic transformation.
The more interesting question is what happened to that tradition.
From economic revolution to constitutional politics
The National Conference’s political journey after independence was anything but linear.
Land reforms became one of the most consequential parts of its legacy.
The political movement that had challenged feudal structures eventually presided over sweeping agrarian changes in Jammu and Kashmir.
At the constitutional level, however, another issue increasingly came to dominate the party’s political identity: autonomy.
The special constitutional position of Jammu and Kashmir, particularly Article 370, became central to the NC’s political narrative.
That trajectory eventually produced today’s political vocabulary.
The party that once spoke extensively about land reform and economic reconstruction now frequently speaks about:
- restoration of Article 370;
- restoration of statehood;
- constitutional safeguards;
- autonomy;
- political prisoners;
- identity and dignity.
None of these issues is insignificant.
But they compete for political space with problems that are far more immediate in the daily lives of many Kashmiris.
And that is where the generational question begins.
What does a 25-year-old Kashmiri want to hear?
The young Kashmiri entering the labour market in 2026 was not alive in 1990.
For many, even the political atmosphere of the pre-2019 era is something they know largely through family memories, political speeches and social media.
Their concerns are different.
Can I find a job?
Can I start a business?
Can I get affordable housing?
Can I build a career without leaving Kashmir?
Can I access modern education?
Can my village get reliable internet and transport?
Can Srinagar become a better-planned city?
Can tourism create stable employment rather than seasonal income?
Can agriculture and horticulture become more profitable?
These are not abstract questions.
They are economic questions with political consequences.
Official data itself underlines the scale of the employment challenge. The Periodic Labour Force Survey’s April-June 2024 bulletin showed an unemployment rate of 29.8% among urban 15-29-year-olds in Jammu & Kashmir, compared with 16.8% nationally for the same category and period.
The state’s own Economic Survey 2025-26, meanwhile, reported an improvement in labour-force participation, with J&K’s LFPR rising from 56.3% in 2019-20 to 64.3% in 2023-24.
Both facts can be true.
More people can enter the labour market while young people continue to struggle to find suitable employment.
That is precisely why employment remains one of the most politically important issues in contemporary Kashmir.
The NC knows this—and its own manifesto proves it
This is where the charge that the National Conference is simply “stuck in 1931” becomes too simplistic.
The party’s 2024 Assembly election manifesto included a substantial economic and welfare agenda.
It promised one lakh jobs, protection of land and employment rights, free electricity for certain households, support for Kashmiri Pandit return and rehabilitation, welfare measures for economically weaker women, and measures relating to infrastructure and economic development.
At the same time, it promised restoration of Article 370 and 35A, restoration of statehood and implementation of the 2000 autonomy resolution.
In other words, the party’s own programme contains both identity politics and development politics.
That matters.
The criticism is therefore not that the NC has no policy agenda for jobs or development.
The more credible criticism is that constitutional and historical questions often receive greater political visibility than the party’s economic agenda.
That is a different—and much harder—argument to answer.
The 2026 internal dissent makes the question sharper
The debate is not confined to opposition parties.
It has also appeared inside the National Conference itself.
Srinagar MP Aga Ruhullah Mehdi has repeatedly challenged the party leadership over the balance between statehood and the restoration of Article 370.
In August 2026, Ruhullah directly confronted party president Farooq Abdullah, arguing that the party’s current position on statehood risked becoming indistinguishable from the BJP’s position on that particular issue.
His broader argument has been that the NC received a political mandate for more than statehood alone and should continue to press for restoration of constitutional safeguards associated with Article 370.
That disagreement is revealing.
It suggests that the NC’s problem is not simply that it talks about history.
It is also debating which part of its historical and constitutional legacy should dominate its present-day politics.
Farooq Abdullah’s generation carries the memory of the pre-1953 constitutional order.
Omar Abdullah operates in the post-2019 political landscape.
Ruhullah represents a younger political voice demanding that the party not dilute its constitutional position.
Meanwhile, the wider electorate is asking what all of this means for everyday life.
That is a much more complicated political equation than “1931 versus 2026.”
July 13 itself has become part of the contemporary political contest
The continued commemoration of July 13 is also evidence that history remains politically active.
In 2026, the National Conference planned a programme at the Mazar-e-Shuhada in Srinagar to commemorate the martyrs.
The programme was reportedly prevented from proceeding amid security restrictions, and the party subsequently held a commemorative event at its headquarters. Omar Abdullah criticised the restrictions as an injustice to history and democratic values.
For the NC, this reinforces the argument that historical memory remains relevant to contemporary politics.
For its critics, it illustrates the opposite: that the party repeatedly returns to historical confrontation instead of concentrating on governance.
Either way, the episode demonstrates that 1931 is not simply history in Kashmir—it remains part of the political present.
But Kashmir’s development agenda is changing rapidly
There is another problem with treating contemporary Kashmir as if it is politically frozen.
The economic structure of J&K is changing.
The administration’s 2026-27 budget has placed significant emphasis on entrepreneurship, skill development, digital governance, urban infrastructure and employment generation.
The government reported that 7,650 candidates were appointed to government service during 2025, while announcing plans to fast-track recruitment to thousands of additional vacancies.
Its Mission YUVA programme is designed around entrepreneurship and self-employment, with applications coming from across the Union Territory.
The budget also places emphasis on skilling, ITIs, digital platforms and industry-linked training.
Urban development is another major concern.
Srinagar and Jammu are dealing with expanding populations, transport pressure, waste management, drainage and infrastructure requirements.
The 2026-27 budget includes projects involving wastewater treatment, public transport and urban infrastructure.
This is the political terrain on which today’s parties increasingly have to compete.
Historical identity can mobilise voters.
But governance determines whether those voters remain satisfied after the election.
The “1931” charge works politically—but only up to a point
Opposition parties have obvious reasons to describe the NC as outdated.
The slogan is simple.
It creates a contrast between:
NC’s 1931:
Martyrs, Dogra rule, autonomy, Article 370, constitutional identity.
Today’s youth:
Jobs, startups, technology, education, roads, tourism, housing and better urban services.
The contrast is politically effective.
But it is not entirely fair.
The NC has repeatedly campaigned on contemporary issues.
Its 2024 manifesto, for example, did not simply consist of constitutional demands. It contained an explicit commitment to one lakh jobs alongside welfare, electricity, infrastructure and economic promises.
So the more accurate criticism is about political emphasis and delivery, not the complete absence of modern policy.
The question is whether the party can turn those promises into measurable outcomes.
The real test is no longer what the NC remembers
Every political movement has a memory.
The BJP invokes its own historical narratives.
The Congress carries the legacy of the freedom movement.
Regional parties across India draw legitimacy from founding struggles and cultural identities.
There is nothing unusual about the NC doing the same.
The problem begins when historical legitimacy becomes a substitute for performance.
A voter who is unemployed may respect the 1931 martyrs and still demand a job.
A shopkeeper may support restoration of statehood and simultaneously complain about poor urban infrastructure.
A student may care deeply about Article 370 and also want world-class universities.
A farmer may have strong views on Kashmir’s political status while worrying more immediately about crop insurance, market access and weather losses.
People do not necessarily choose between identity and development.
They want both.
That is the political reality parties often underestimate.
Kashmir’s new generation is not necessarily rejecting history
This is another important nuance.
It would be wrong to assume that young Kashmiris have simply abandoned historical identity.
Political identity does not disappear because economic priorities change.
A young voter can be deeply attached to Kashmiri history while also being intensely pragmatic about employment.
The rise of smartphones and social media has not erased political memory.
If anything, it has made historical narratives easier to circulate.
The difference is that young people now compare Kashmir with the rest of India and the world in real time.
They see how other cities are developing.
They compare universities.
They watch startup culture.
They follow global technology.
They see employment opportunities abroad.
They understand digital commerce.
That creates a new political expectation.
They do not want Kashmir’s politics to choose between dignity and development.
They want a political system capable of delivering both.
From “Naya Kashmir” to “New Kashmir”: the unfinished transition
There is perhaps a deeper irony here.
The National Conference’s own most ambitious historical programme was called Naya Kashmir—New Kashmir.
The 1944 document attempted to imagine what a transformed Jammu and Kashmir could look like.
It was radical for its time because it tried to connect political freedom with economic and social rights.
Nearly eight decades later, Kashmir once again needs a new development vision.
But the problems are different.
The old questions included landlordism, illiteracy, political representation and feudal authority.
The new ones include:
- youth unemployment;
- private-sector job creation;
- technology and digital infrastructure;
- climate vulnerability;
- tourism sustainability;
- urban congestion;
- modern healthcare;
- higher education;
- entrepreneurship;
- women’s participation in the workforce;
- agricultural value chains; and
- integration with wider markets.
This is where the National Conference faces perhaps its biggest ideological challenge.
Can it produce a 21st-century equivalent of Naya Kashmir?
Or will it continue relying primarily on the political capital generated by its historic legacy?
That may be a more important question than whether the party commemorates July 13.
The economic challenge is particularly serious
J&K’s economy is growing, but growth alone does not solve the employment problem.
The 2026-27 budget analysis by PRS estimates J&K’s GSDP at approximately ₹3.16 lakh crore at current prices, with services accounting for around 61% of the economy, agriculture 20% and manufacturing 19% in 2025-26 estimates.
That structure creates both opportunity and vulnerability.
Tourism can generate employment but remains sensitive to security perceptions and shocks.
Agriculture and horticulture employ large numbers but face climate and market risks.
Government employment remains attractive but cannot absorb the entire young workforce.
Manufacturing has room to expand but requires investment, infrastructure and market access.
The obvious answer is a stronger private economy.
And that requires policies that encourage entrepreneurs to invest, hire and scale.
This is precisely where political parties need to move beyond slogans.
What would a modern NC agenda look like?
If the National Conference wants to neutralise the “stuck in 1931” criticism, it does not necessarily need to abandon its history.
It needs to reinterpret it.
The political values associated with 1931—dignity, representation and opposition to arbitrary authority—could be connected to contemporary governance.
The economic ideas of Naya Kashmir could be translated into modern priorities:
Land reform → productive land use and agricultural modernisation
Workers’ rights → formal employment and social security
Women’s equality → higher female labour-force participation
Economic planning → targeted industrial and tourism policy
Universal education → modern skill and technology education
Democratic participation → transparent and accountable governance
That would give the party a way to argue that its history is not an anchor.
It is a foundation.
But that argument has to be demonstrated through policy outcomes.
The danger of becoming a party of memory
Every long-established political party eventually faces the same danger.
Its greatest historical achievement can become its greatest political burden.
The National Conference has enormous symbolic capital.
It can invoke Sheikh Abdullah.
It can invoke 1931.
It can invoke Naya Kashmir.
It can invoke Quit Kashmir.
It can invoke Article 370.
It can invoke autonomy.
But symbolic capital depreciates if younger voters do not see a connection between those ideas and their daily lives.
A party cannot indefinitely ask a new generation to vote on the basis of what its predecessors achieved.
Eventually, it has to explain what it intends to achieve next.
That is the point at which historical legitimacy becomes a test of contemporary competence.
1931 is not the problem. Staying in 1931 could be.
The criticism that the National Conference is “still stuck in 1931” contains a political truth, but not necessarily a literal historical one.
The NC’s relationship with 1931 is deliberate.
It sees the July uprising as the beginning of the political movement from which its own organisational history eventually emerged.
But the National Conference itself came into existence later, first as the Muslim Conference in 1932 and then as the National Conference in 1939.
Its history also includes the remarkably ambitious Naya Kashmir programme of 1944, major land reforms, constitutional politics and successive debates over autonomy.
So the real question facing the party in 2026 is not whether it should stop remembering 1931.
It is whether it can build a political bridge from 1931 to 2031.
That means preserving historical memory while addressing the unemployment statistics.
It means defending political dignity while improving public services.
It means talking about Article 370 while also talking about artificial intelligence, tourism, entrepreneurship and private-sector employment.
It means remembering Sheikh Abdullah while understanding the aspirations of young Kashmiris who have grown up in a radically different economic and technological environment.
The National Conference does not need to forget its past.
But if its political vocabulary remains overwhelmingly about the past, its opponents will continue to ask whether the party has run out of answers for the future.
And that is ultimately what the phrase “stuck in 1931” is really about.
Not history.
Relevance.
