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Supreme Court Issues Contempt Notice to Lawyer Pravin Singhal Over Remarks Against CJI Surya Kant

Supreme Court Issues Contempt Notice to Lawyer Pravin Singhal Over Remarks Against CJI Surya Kant

Pravin Singhal Contempt Case: Supreme Court Sets January 20 Hearing

By: Javid Amin | 18 November 2026

The Supreme Court’s decision to issue a criminal contempt notice to advocate Pravin Singhal has brought a sensitive question back into focus: where does legitimate criticism of the judiciary end, and conduct that may undermine the authority of the courts begin?

On November 18, a three-judge Bench comprising Justices Dipankar Datta, Joymalya Bagchi and V. Mohana took up a petition moved by the Supreme Court Bar Association (SCBA) over remarks Singhal allegedly made against Chief Justice of India Surya Kant during a court proceeding two days earlier.

The Bench said it was prima facie satisfied that the allegations deserved to be taken forward and issued notice to the advocate. Singhal has been asked to file his response by January 8, 2027, and remain personally present on the next date of hearing, January 20.

The order is an important procedural development, but it is not a finding of guilt. The allegations must still be examined, and Singhal must have an opportunity to respond before the Court decides whether his conduct amounts to criminal contempt.

What happened inside the courtroom on November 16?

The incident took place on November 16, when Singhal approached a Bench comprising CJI Surya Kant and Justices Joymalya Bagchi and V. Mohana, seeking an urgent hearing in a matter reportedly concerning allegations of corruption in the judiciary.

Singhal reportedly told the Bench that he had submitted papers to the CJI’s office on November 2 but had received no response. When the Chief Justice asked him to wait, the advocate allegedly refused and questioned his suitability to occupy the office.

According to reports by Bar and Bench and LiveLaw, Singhal told the CJI: “You cannot sit in that chair. You do not deserve. You do not have the integrity for that.”

The audio-video feed of the proceedings was subsequently switched off, and security personnel escorted him out of the courtroom.

The exchange was not merely a disagreement over the listing of a case. The alleged remarks directly questioned the personal integrity and authority of the country’s Chief Justice while he was presiding over court proceedings. That distinction is central to the contempt petition.

However, the underlying matter that Singhal wanted heard also deserves attention. Reports say it concerned allegations of corruption in the judiciary, but the available coverage does not provide enough information to establish the precise allegations, the persons or institutions concerned, or the material he had submitted. Those allegations should not be treated as proven simply because they formed the background to the courtroom confrontation.

Why did the Supreme Court Bar Association intervene?

The Supreme Court Bar Association moved quickly after the incident.

On November 17, SCBA Secretary Pragya Baghel and Joint Secretary Meenesh Dubey brought the matter to the Court’s attention. They informed the Bench that the association had obtained the Attorney General’s consent to initiate criminal contempt proceedings against Singhal.

The SCBA also reportedly told the Court that it possessed video recordings showing the advocate making similar remarks against the CJI on earlier occasions. These recordings were mentioned as part of the association’s submissions; their contents and evidentiary significance will have to be assessed through the proceedings.

SCBA president and senior advocate Pradeep Rai described the conduct as unacceptable and argued that strict action was necessary to prevent similar incidents. He also clarified that Singhal was not a member of the association.

Solicitor General Tushar Mehta supported the plea, telling the Court that the majesty of the institution could not be compromised.

The intervention reflects a concern within the legal fraternity that courtroom proceedings cannot function if advocates are allowed to turn disagreements with judges into personal confrontations. Lawyers have a right to challenge judicial decisions, question administrative delays and raise concerns about the functioning of courts. But those rights operate within professional and legal standards governing courtroom conduct.

The difficult question is how to enforce those standards without creating the impression that judicial authority is beyond scrutiny.

Attorney General’s consent: what does the law require?

The proceedings have been initiated under the criminal contempt framework of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

Section 2(c) defines criminal contempt broadly. It covers acts or publications that scandalise or tend to scandalise a court, lower or tend to lower its authority, interfere with judicial proceedings, or obstruct the administration of justice.

Section 15 deals with how the Supreme Court and High Courts may take cognisance of criminal contempt outside contempt committed directly in their presence. Under Section 15(1)(b), a motion by a person other than the law officers specified in the Act requires the written consent of the Attorney General or Solicitor General, as applicable.

In this case, Attorney General R. Venkataramani granted consent on November 17 after considering the request made by the SCBA. He reportedly described the alleged conduct as “extremely scandalous and unpardonable” and considered it appropriate for criminal contempt action.

That consent is an important procedural step, but it does not amount to a judicial finding that contempt has been committed. It allows the matter to be brought before the Court through the statutory process. The Supreme Court must independently consider the allegations and the response before reaching a conclusion.

There is another important provision. Section 13 of the Act states that a court cannot impose a sentence for contempt unless the conduct is of such a nature that it substantially interferes, or tends substantially to interfere, with the due course of justice. It also allows truth to be raised as a defence where the Court considers it to be in the public interest and the request is made bona fide.

These provisions matter because contempt jurisdiction is not intended to punish every unpleasant remark or disagreement with a judge.

Criticism of judges is not automatically contempt

The case raises a constitutional question that goes beyond the conduct of one advocate: how should courts balance their authority with the public’s right to criticise the judiciary?

Judges and courts are not exempt from public scrutiny. Judicial decisions can be questioned, legal reasoning can be challenged, and concerns about delays, transparency, accountability or alleged misconduct can be raised through appropriate channels.

Section 5 of the Contempt of Courts Act specifically protects fair comment on the merits of a case that has been heard and finally decided. Section 4 protects the publication of fair and accurate reports of judicial proceedings.

The Supreme Court has also recognised the importance of distinguishing legitimate criticism from conduct that interferes with the administration of justice.

In its September 2021 judgment in Suraz India Trust v. Union of India, the Court observed that contempt jurisdiction exists to maintain the dignity of judicial institutions, not as a vindictive exercise. It noted that inappropriate statements do not automatically lower a judge’s dignity and that judgments remain open to fair and reasonable criticism.

This principle is particularly important in a constitutional democracy. A judiciary that commands public respect must also remain open to reasoned criticism. At the same time, personal attacks, intimidation or attempts to obstruct proceedings may raise concerns that go beyond criticism of a judicial decision.

The distinction will depend on the words used, the circumstances in which they were spoken, their context and their potential effect on the administration of justice.

In Singhal’s case, the allegation is that he directly challenged the CJI’s integrity and entitlement to hold office during a live court proceeding. The Supreme Court will have to decide whether the alleged conduct crosses the legal threshold for criminal contempt.

The wider context: growing disputes over criticism of the judiciary

The Singhal proceedings have also emerged against a broader backdrop of contempt petitions involving public remarks about the CJI and the judiciary.

Bar and Bench reported that the SCBA office-bearers sought to link the Singhal matter with pending criminal contempt proceedings involving journalist Nikhil Wagle and Shiv Sena (UBT) MP Sanjay Raut. Those proceedings concern remarks about the CJI and the judiciary following the Chief Justice’s decision not to meet a delegation of Opposition leaders seeking an audience over the functioning of the Election Commission of India.

The Supreme Court had issued notices to Wagle and Raut on October 16, asking them to explain why contempt proceedings should not be initiated against them.

The cases are not identical. One concerns alleged remarks made inside a courtroom by an advocate; the other concerns public comments by political and media figures. Their facts and legal questions must be assessed separately.

Nevertheless, the developments highlight an ongoing debate over the limits of public criticism of judicial institutions. The issue is particularly sensitive when allegations concern the integrity of judges, the independence of courts or the administration of justice.

There is a legitimate public interest in discussing such questions. But there is also a need to ensure that allegations are supported by evidence and that judicial proceedings are not disrupted through personal intimidation.

What happens next?

The Supreme Court has issued notice, giving Singhal an opportunity to respond to the allegations.

According to reports of the November 18 proceedings:

  • Singhal has been directed to file his reply by January 8, 2027.

  • He has been directed to remain personally present on the next hearing date.

  • The matter has been listed for January 20, 2027.

  • The three-judge Bench will consider the response and the material placed before it.

The next stage will be important because the Court will have to examine the precise allegations, the circumstances of the exchange and the material relied upon by the SCBA.

The notice itself should not be confused with a conviction or a final determination of contempt. Singhal has not yet been found guilty. The proceedings must follow the law and provide him an opportunity to answer the case.

The real test: protecting judicial dignity without discouraging accountability

The Supreme Court’s action brings an important institutional question into focus. Courts need authority to conduct proceedings without intimidation, disruption or personal abuse. Advocates, meanwhile, must be able to raise genuine grievances, question administrative decisions and pursue allegations of wrongdoing through lawful procedures.

Neither principle should cancel the other.

If allegations of corruption or administrative misconduct are raised, they must be examined through appropriate legal and institutional mechanisms. If an advocate uses a courtroom confrontation to make personal attacks against a judge, the Court is entitled to consider whether its contempt jurisdiction has been attracted.

The danger lies at both extremes. Treating every criticism of a judge as contempt could discourage legitimate scrutiny. Allowing personal intimidation and unsupported attacks to disrupt proceedings could weaken the authority and functioning of the courts.

The outcome of the Singhal case will therefore matter beyond the individual advocate. It will test how the Supreme Court applies contempt law in a situation involving alleged personal attacks on the CJI, while preserving the distinction between criticism of the judiciary and conduct that threatens the administration of justice.

Judicial dignity cannot mean freedom from criticism. Equally, freedom of expression cannot mean freedom to obstruct or intimidate a court. The law must protect both principles.

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